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Lousiana: Louisiana refuses to sign BP-Coast Guard oil spill cleanup transition plan – NOLA.com

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Lousiana: Louisiana refuses to sign BP Coast Guard oil spill cleanup transition plan – NOLA.com

The state of Louisiana has refused to sign off on a Coast Guard-BP plan to transition from a cleanup program to a long-term recovery in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, charging that the plan leaves coastal beaches and wetlands vulnerable to continued oil contamination with no guarantee that BP will be required to pay for future cleanups.

The state is particularly concerned that the plan includes no long-term monitoring for additional oil, contains provisions that are likely to disrupt a multibillion-dollar federal-state coastal restoration program, and excludes parish leaders from decision-making. those are the highlights of a Nov. 2 letter sent to Coast Guard Capt. Julia Hein, federal on-scene coordinator for the spill, by state Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority Chairman Garret Graves.

“we said we have 23 miles of shoreline where there’s still oil being found and millions of barrels of BP oil in the Gulf that’s unaccounted for,” Graves said Wednesday. “we still have sporadic re-oilings, and you can’t tell us where the oil is.”

The plan has gone into effect despite the state’s objections. the federal on-scene coordinator does not need state agreement to determine whether cleanup of a particular area is complete.

In an e-mail response to questions, Hein said long-term monitoring isn’t ruled out by the new plan. The federal Natural Resources Damage Assessment process also provides for long-term monitoring, she said.

“If oil appears in areas that have already been deemed as ‘clean,’ Coast Guard will respond according to Coast Guard’s established policy and procedures,” she said.

In a telephone news conference, Mike Utsler, head of BP’s Gulf Coast Restoration Organization, termed the plan “a milestone in an ongoing journey in the process of completing the response,” and said existing and future oil attributed to the Macondo well would be dealt with by BP.

“for the past 18 months, we have had extensive on-water, on-marsh, on-ground surveying with specialized teams who have mapped, remapped and remapped the shoreline consequence and impact,” Utsler said. “we know the shorelines of Louisiana. We’ve engaged local and state and parish support to the understanding of and review of those shorelines, so we have a very good baseline understanding of the shoreline of Louisiana, of where impacts have occurred, where ongoing impacts continue to occur and where ongoing work continues to complete that.”

He said Louisiana cleanup officials had participated in developing the response plan, along with an extensive cross-section of scientists from federal agencies and other states.

“What this has done is establish a clear standard for how clean and what clean is scientifically, as agreed to by those group of shoreline specialists,” he said.

Under the plan, when a segment of beach reaches that goal, it is removed from additional clean-up requirements. Response to future oiling in such an area would rely on public reports to the Coast Guard’s National Response Center, which might then result in a Coast Guard response — and, if the oil is determined to be from the Macondo well, a BP-financed clean-up.

But Graves said the plan is flawed because it would absolve BP from paying for any future cleanup in sections of the coast where a restoration project is under way. He said Hein refused to agree to a state proposal that would have allowed restoration projects to be suspended until a clean-up were completed if additional oil from the Macondo well were found.

“How can we sign out of the response effort without knowing what’s going to happen?” he said. “I don’t think it’s in the public interest to let BP out of its responsibility to clean this up, because we could be dealing with this for decades.”

Again, Hein said that if BP oil is found on coastal properties, BP will be held accountable.

The state also objected to the plan’s exclusion of parish governments from participating in future response decision-making involving their wetlands and beaches.

“we spent months working very intensely with every single coastal parish president, working with the Coast Guard and BP on a transition plan,” Graves said. “This plan unilaterally trumps the agreements signed by the state and parishes. they were all thrown out.”

Hein said the new plan does allow for local government participation, but that the National Contingency Plan governs decision-making under the plan, and does not give decision-making rights to parishes and counties.

Graves also is objecting to what he says is a refusal by the Coast Guard to continue to monitor for oil leaking from the Macondo well after remotely operated submersibles failed to find evidence of a leak after reports of oil at the site several weeks ago.

“we said, look, there’s still uncertainty here about the source of this oil, and we need some type of monitoring program over the wellhead to determine it there’s some new trend,” he said. “do an aerial survey on a regular basis and we’ll revisit the need in a few months if there are additional hits of oil.

“she said no, they were not going to do that,” he said. “so we put together our own plan using state planes and helicopters and asked them to approve (BP paying for) that.

“she said, no, we’re not going to fund that, either,” he said.

“It’s like they’re a victim of Stockholm Syndrome,” Graves said, referring to a psychological phenomenon where hostages become sympathetic to their captors. “the Coast Guard is supposed to be a federal agency representing the public.”

Hein insisted, however, that the Coast Guard has and will respond to all reports of oil, as it did earlier this year when it required both BP and Transocean, the owner of the sunken Deepwater Horizon drillship, to search the ocean bottom for leakage.

She said Coast Guard marine safety officials based in Morgan City investigated 2,231 reports filed with the National Response Center, including 372 reports of sheen.

“the nearly daily reporting of sheens for which we cannot identify a source reflects the myriad of potential sources in the Gulf of Mexico, including pipelines, platforms, sunken platforms, active and abandoned wells, as well as transiting vessels,” she said.

Also objecting to the plan is the manager of Wisner Donation Trust property along the coast just south of Port Fourchon, who has been in a running battle with BP and Coast Guard officials over the clean-up of BP oil there.

“I still have 90 people on my beach cleaning oil,” said Cathy Norman. she said clean-up teams also are still working on the adjacent state-owned Elmer’s Island beach. Large quantities of tar balls and weathered oil mat material were unearthed by waves or washed ashore this summer during Tropical Storm Lee.

When the BP-Coast Guard team leading clean-up operations requested permission to remove the material, Norman said she asked them to follow an existing clean-up agreement between BP and Wisner that limited the use of heavy equipment on the beach and in wetlands behind it, and required before and after aerial photography to track damage caused by the cleanup.

“we sent e-mail after e-mail explaining that this was the way it was going to be done, and all of a sudden, their airboats showed up and they started working with heavy equipment,” she said. A request for assistance from Hein to assure that BP restored any sand lost to the clean-up operation, Norman said, resulted in the Coast Guard official saying the federal government was not required to follow the language of the agreement, and refusing to meet with her to discuss the issue.

“as you know, the replacement of natural resources is not a removal activity under the (National Contingency Plan). Because these actions would fall outside of the (federal on-scene coordinator’s) authority, we cannot discuss or make representations on this matter,” Hein wrote in an Oct. 17 letter.

“They’re just running willy-nilly, doing things in our wetlands that they’re not mitigating for as they go,” Norman said. “They’ve compounded the erosion of our land because for 18 months, they’ve been using heavy equipment on a beach that’s already eroding.

“No one’s holding them accountable,” she said.

Norman said she’s also concerned about the wording in the plan that describes when a clean-up can be considered complete.

At a non-residential beach, such as the Fourchon coastline, the standard would be less than 1 percent distribution of oil and oiled debris, “or as low as reasonably practicable considering the allowed treatment methods and net environmental benefit.”

She said scientists working for Wisner  ”have found they don’t even come close to meeting that on our property.”

And there’s no clear understanding of who determines ”net environmental benefit,” she said.

“that gives BP the ability to stop whenever they want,” she said. ”We’re appalled by all of this.”

BP places part of the blame for the Fourchon cleanup, which they term 80 percent complete, on the rules Wisner placed on contractors removing oil that that was washed ashore and covered with sand by Tropical Storm Bonnie during the summer of 2010.

BP spokesman Curtis Thomas said Wisner officials limited cleaning to the first six inches of beach sand, while Bonnie’s waves had deposited sand that buried oil below that depth, along with Tiger Boom anchors and oil snare material.

“Operations are expected to be completed in approximately two weeks, at which point these segments will enter patrolling and monitoring,” he said. “in short, it is premature to make a determination as to whether the property in question has been ‘adequately cleaned.’”

image – nola.com

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dZHnStD690U&hl=en&fs=1&rel=0]

Lousiana: Louisiana refuses to sign BP-Coast Guard oil spill cleanup transition plan – NOLA.com

Testimony of Rear Admiral Paul Zukunft, U.S. Coast Guard, before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, “Looking to the Future: Lessons in Prevention, Response, and Restoration from the Gulf Oil Spill”

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Testimony of Rear Admiral Paul Zukunft, U.S. Coast Guard, before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, Looking to the Future: Lessons in Prevention, Response, and Restoration from the Gulf Oil Spill

Release Date: July 20, 2011

Russell Senate Office Building

Good morning Chairman Begich, Ranking Member Snowe, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am honored to appear before you today to discuss the lessons learned from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill.

Background

On the evening of April 20, 2010, an explosion aboard the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) Deepwater Horizon led to the sinking of the MODU, the tragic loss of 11 lives, and the worst oil spill in U.S. history. Given the size and scope of the spill, Secretary Napolitano designated the incident a Spill of National Significance (SONS) and designated then-Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen as the National Incident Commander (NIC). due to the severity of the spill, the complexity of the response effort, and the large-scale potential for adverse impacts on the environment and public health, this response required extraordinary coordination of federal, state, local, tribal and commercial resources to contain and mitigate the effects of the spill. Using the framework provided for in the National Contingency Plan (NCP), a monumental response was undertaken through the unified efforts of more than 47,000 federal, state, and local responders, including more than 7,000 active and reserve Coast Guard members. We established five Incident Command Posts (ICPs) across the Gulf Coast states and 15 staging areas to help flow critical resources to impacted locations. I served as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) for more than six months during the response and recovery period.

The size and scope of this incident required significant coordination of public and private resources at both the strategic and operational level. the command and control structure facilitated the NIC and FOSC’s ability to direct and coordinate with other federal, state and local stakeholders to address the most critical needs. the FOSC worked with other parties to address operational resource requests and state-by-state concerns throughout the operation. the NIC provided national-level support to the operational response – from resources to policy decisions – to secure the source and mitigate the impact of the spill. the NIC and the FOSC met regularly with key stakeholders, including the Governors of each state on the Gulf Coast and established a critical line of communication to resolve conflicts. At the operational level, a Unified Area Command was established to oversee operational activities across the entire Gulf Region. the FOSC served as the Unified Area Commander in accordance with established incident command doctrine, and under the Unified Area Command (UAC) there were the five ICPs: Houston, TX; Galveston, TX; Houma, LA; Mobile, AL; and Miami, FL.

Although the role and functions of the NIC evolved considerably during the response, the NIC concept proved to be an extremely effective command organization that promoted unity of effort across all levels of government, ensured that timely information was provided to the public and first responders, and efficiently marshaled the resources of the federal government, private sector, and international sources to combat this unprecedented oil spill. as the first SONS and NIC designation in U.S. history, the BP Deepwater Horizon (DWH) oil spill response enabled us to learn a great deal about NIC roles and responsibilities. Going forward, the Coast Guard will work with our interagency partners to memorialize in doctrine and policy the responsibilities that accrued to the NIC during this response.

The effort to contain and secure the well and the resulting spill response effort became extraordinarily large and complex. this effort required two drilling ships, numerous oil containment vessels used to control the source, and the highly coordinated use of mechanical recovery, surface burning, and dispersant applications. the weather significantly impacted our ability to carry out skimming and surface burn operations. Despite these constraints, we employed more than 835 oil skimmers, more than 6,100 response boats and 3,190 vessels of opportunity, and over 120 aircraft. more than 34.7 million gallons of oil-water mix were recovered through skimming, 411 controlled in-situ burns removing over 11 million gallons of oil from the open water, and the dispersion of oil both at the surface and at the wellhead.

Response operations took place in four zones: at the source of the spill, off-shore, near-shore, and in-shore. At the source, the drilling rigs and remotely operated vehicles necessary for deep water drilling were the only means of accessing the well at a depth of 5,000 feet. Off-shore, as close to the source as possible, the response focused on removal of the oil. Key to these operations were large skimmers and in situ burn task forces. Near-shore operations focused on skimming and the use of booms to protect sensitive areas and as much of the shoreline as possible. in Barataria Bay, for example, shoreline operations involved extensive assessment, environmental protection, and treatment strategies. after the well was capped, shoreline cleanup became the focus of continued response operations.

Health and Safety was a primary strategic goal throughout this response, as reflected by our efforts to address the potential public health impacts of the spill and the remarkably low injury rate for responders across the operation. At its peak, there were 47,000 people working on the response, ranging from those drilling relief wells on ships fifty miles off-shore to those working on skimming and booming vessels and the work crews cleaning the shoreline. Thousands of personnel worked to decontaminate oiled booms, vessels and equipment. a significant safety organization was staffed by numerous federal and state agencies and private safety experts who oversaw and examined broad aspects of worker safety.

Overall, Section 311 of the clean Water Act, as ameded by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA ’90), as well as the NCP and the supporting National Incident Management System (NIMS), proved effective during the DWH oil spill response. the NCP provided a sound framework that allowed for the needed discretion and freedom of action to address contingencies that arose.

Major Report Summaries

As with any incident, there are ongoing assessments and reviews to gain a better understanding of lessons learned from the response to inform equipment standards, technology, and preparedness to respond in the future. these assessments come from both Coast Guard and third party reviews.

The National Incident Commander’s Report, released on October 1, 2010, discussed the effectiveness of the NCP as the United States’ blueprint for responding to both oil spills and hazardous substance releases. the report reviewed the roles and responsibilities of the NIC and examined whether existing legal authorities and doctrine were adequate. Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen provided his observations and recommendations regarding the authorities, doctrine, and policy that collectively provide the governance constructs used for oil spill response. Admiral Allen offered key recommendations to improve our collective ability to respond to the next major oil or hazardous substance release. these key recommendations include:

  • Incentivizing the private sector to develop 21st century oil spill response capabilities to keep pace with advancing technologies in oil exploration, deepwater offshore drilling, oil production, and maritime transportation;
  • Ensuring that all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal government authorities and response structures are included in response plans and their elected or appointed officials are invited to participate in oil spill response exercises; and
  • Ensuring a NIC has appropriate authorities necessary for the execution of the position.

The National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling was created by Executive Order 13543 on May 21, 2010 as an independent, nonpartisan entity directed to provide a thorough analysis and impartial judgment of the DHW oil spill. the Commission was charged with examining the facts and circumstances concerning the root causes of the DWH explosion, improving the country’s ability to respond to oil spills associated with offshore drilling, and recommending reforms to make offshore energy production safer. the report develops options to overhaul the U.S. approach to drilling safety and greatly reduce the chances of a similar, large scale disaster in the future.

The Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Manual prescribes a process to conduct a comprehensive review to capture lessons learned from a major spill response. the Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) is the process by which the Coast Guard examines the implementation and effectiveness of the preparedness for and response to a major response, as it relates to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, Area Contingency Plans and other oil spill response plans. on June 14, 2010, the Commandant of Coast Guard Admiral Robert Papp, Jr., chartered an ISPR team to conduct an independent, third-party review of the Deepwater Horizon response. the ISPR team was comprised of federal and state government representatives along with representatives from the oil exploration and production industry, non-governmental organizations, community groups and the professional oil spill response industry who served as technical advisors. the report represents the views of the ISPR team and provides an assessment of the Coast Guard’s preparedness process as well as recommended corrective actions.

On April 27, 2010, the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Interior jointly convened an investigation into the marine casualty, explosion, fire, pollution, and sinking of the DWH. Volume I of the report of this joint investigation concerns matters under the juridication of the Coast Guard. the Coast Guard members of the joint investigation released Volume I on April 22, 2011. Volume II of the report will address matters under the jurisidiction of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE).

Lastly, the FOSC report is under development. the FOSC report will contain observations and perspectives of the FOSC regarding the oil removal operation and actions taken. as required by 33 C.F.R.§ 300.165, the report will document the situation as it developed, the actions taken, the resources committed, and challenges.

Coast Guard Initiatives Resulting From Deepwater Horizon Lessons Learned

The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and other incidents have prompted the Coast Guard to review all operations and systems under its responsibility for potential improvements to both regulations and the inspection regime for foreign-flagged MODUs on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). Prior to the incident, we were already pursuing improvements to our offshore inspection capability through our marine safety improvement program. We recently increased our inspection resources and established an Offshore National Center of Expertise that greatly enhances inspector competency.

All MODUs operating in the United States are subject to annual examinations to verify compliance with area laws and international conventions. if that exam finds “questionable equipment, systems, or crew competency issues” the Coast Guard can expand its investigation to determine whether a deficiency exists, and may require additional tests, inspections, or crew drills. on July 7, 2011 we announced in the Federal Register a risk-based oversight program for MODUs that will result in more frequent examinations of the highest risk MODUs based on accident history, past discrepancies, flag state performance, and classification society performance. Marine inspectors will focus on critical areas representing the greatest risks, such as dynamic positioning systems and operator competency. the President’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 budget request seeks additional Marine Safety personnel, including Inspectors and Investigators, to staff vessel inspections and post-incident investigations.

Additionally, we are actively engaged in oversight of rapidly developing well spill containment capabilities (Marine well Containment System and Helix well Control Group) to promote rigorous testing to ensure these response vessels are capable of responding to a deepwater well spill and meet applicable safety and environmental requirements. We recently established an OCS Activities Matrix Team to leverage expertise throughout the Coast Guard including various headquarters offices, the Marine Safety Center, the Eighth Coast Guard District in new Orleans, LA, and the OCS Center of Expertise. this team will focus on emerging OCS issues and enhance the Coast Guard’s ability to address them, increase our plan review and inspection oversight, support investigations and casualty analysis, and provide a holistic approach to management of OCS safety programs.

The Coast Guard shares MODU regulatory responsibilities with the BOEMRE and each agency’s areas of responsibility are delineated in regulations as well as in Memorandums of Understanding. in general, the Coast Guard’s primary responsibilities are related to vessel operations and safety systems including firefighting, lifesaving, electrical systems, and hull structures on the MODU and BOEMRE’s primary responsibility is subsea operations and drilling systems. the Coast Guard does not oversee drilling systems, but the interface between subsurface and surface operations warrants close coordination and collaboration between both agencies. We continue to engage and improve coordination with BOEMRE through a Prevention Working Group that focuses on enhancing alignment and consistency between the two agencies on how inspections are conducted. the team will coordinate closely with Coast Guard-sponsored OCS stakeholder organizations such as the National Offshore Safety Advisory Committee (NOSAC) and other BOEMRE-Coast Guard meetings and Working Groups as vehicles for improving OCS safety.

The lessons learned from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill emphasize the importance of updated and comprehensive Regional and Area Contingency Plans around the nation. the Coast Guard, as the FOSC for oil spills in the coastal zone, is ensuring the Worst Case Discharge (WCD) planning scenarios are accurate and reflect all potential sources for oil spills, including offshore facilities.

The Coast Guard and BOEMRE have formed a joint Response Workgroup to improve interagency partnerships and collaboratively work on improving preparedness efforts in several areas post-Deepwater Horizon. Significant Workgroup initiatives include joint Oil Spill Response Plan (OSRP) Review, Regional Contingency Plan and Area Contingency Plan WCD Gap Analysis, joint BOEMRE/Coast Guard pollution equipment compliance inspections, and a review of the effective daily recovery capacity standard for mechanical recovery equipment. the Coast Guard and BOEMRE have conducted a joint review of OSRP in BOEMRE’s OCS Gulf of Mexico, Pacific, and Alaska Regions. this review, which included Coast Guard participants from each region, identified the most accurate, up-to-date WCD information for offshore facilities. in addition to the OSRP review, a comprehensive analysis of Regional Contingency Plans (RCP) and Area Contingency Plans (ACP) was conducted to identify significant WCD preparedness gaps.

The Coast Guard directed Area Committees to address these gaps and ensure WCD planning scenarios in all oil spill contingency plans reflect WCD information identified during the joint OSRP review. as mentioned in several key Deepwater Horizon lessons learned reports, the Coast Guard identified the need for Area Committees to encourage more participation from state, local and tribal officials in oil spill planning and preparedness efforts. the Coast Guard also re-emphasized existing guidance for District and Sector Commanders to develop aggressive outreach programs with state, parish, county, and other local officials.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Coast Guard, via the chairs of the National Response Team (NRT) and the Emergency Support Function Leadership Group (ESFLG), have formed a working group to develop recommendations that support improvements for responses involving the whole of government under both the National Response Framework (NRF) and the NCP. this working group is conducting a comprehensive review of the similarities, differences and synergies between the NRF and the NCP.

The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill response also highlighted the need for Oil Spill Research and Development. the FY 2011 appropriations included $4 million for research, development, test, and evaluation of technologies to prevent and respond to oil and hazardous substance spills. in addition, the President’s FY 2012 budget request includes a full-time position for the Interagency Coordination Committee on Oil Pollution Research (ICCOPR) and Research Development Test & Evaluation funding for Oil Spill Detection/Response.

The DWH response highlighted the need for highly qualified surge personnel in the event of pollution incidents. Swift identification of trained and experienced personnel is critical in supporting FOSCs as they carry out their statutory responsibilities. To improve personnel competency in areas that support the Coast Guard FOSCs, we are strengthening our Marine Environmental Response training program for all responders. the President’s FY 2012 budget request seeks 87 new environmental response personnel.

We are also developing a FOSC Representative course that will provide greater competency among junior officers and enlisted personnel who may be called upon to provide command and control functions during a range of oil spill and hazardous material incidents. the President’s FY 2012 budget request also includes funding to establish a Coast Guard National Incident Management assistance Team (IMAT) to an immediate, highly proficient, and deployable surge capacity to Coast Guard Incident Commanders nationwide to responds to threats and other disasters.

We continue to provide leadership and direction towards the establishment of a permanent civilian Regional Response Team (RRT) Co-Chair position at each Coast Guard District. these permanent Co-Chairs will provide leadership, continuity and subject matter expertise to regional elements of the National Response Systems and NRF.

Finally, we are considering personnel enhancements in the pollution response field that will allow our high-performing Marine Science Technician enlisted members to advance into greater leadership roles. Once in place, these experts will be able to lead the Coast Guard through future pollution incidents.

Conclusion

The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill response required the collaborative and sustained response of more than 1,000 organizations and the lessons learned will help inform future Coast Guard operations. the OPA ’90 as well as the NCP were used effectively, and the Incident Command System’s scalable organizational structure proved effective in bringing together federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector entities. the division of responsibilities between the NIC and staff working at the National level, and the FOSC serving as Unified Area Commander at the regional level, was effective in managing national, regional and local demands of this first “Spill of National Significance.”

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and I will be pleased to answer your questions.

This page was last reviewed/modified on July 20, 2011.

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fujHan0aoyQ&hl=en&fs=1&rel=0]

Testimony of Rear Admiral Paul Zukunft, U.S. Coast Guard, before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, “Looking to the Future: Lessons in Prevention, Response, and Restoration from the Gulf Oil Spill”

Louisiana, Florida Residents Differ On Views Of Long-Term Effects Of Oil Spill

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1302740135 99 Louisiana, Florida Residents Differ On Views Of Long Term Effects Of Oil Spill

One year after the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion on the Gulf Coast, new research from the Carsey Institute at the University of New Hampshire shows that despite the roughly equivalent economic compensation, Louisiana and Florida residents differ in perceptions about the current and long-term effects of the largest marine oil spill in U.S. history. “Louisiana residents were more likely …Read more on redOrbit

Tags: Differ, effects, Florida, longterm, Louisiana, Residents, spill, views

Louisiana, Florida Residents Differ On Views Of Long-Term Effects Of Oil Spill

Oil Spill Discussion Takes Center Stage

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1297916114 63 Oil Spill Discussion Takes Center Stage

ResearchOne’s kick-off event featured a look at the Deepwater Horizon oil spill impact.

TAMPA, Fla. (Oct. 11, 2010) – ResearchOne kicked off Monday with a look back at USF’s work in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, which for the past six months has placed the College of Marine Science on the international stage.

While scientists broke new ground in tracking the spill, identifying the plumes of oil beneath the water and in the Gulf’s sediments and its potentially toxic effects on marine life, still much work is underway to fully assess the impact of the environmental disaster.

“We have never had so much oil and so much dispersant put into the Gulf of Mexico,” said College of Marine Science Dean William Hogarth. “We don’t know what the ramifications will be.”

Michael Crosby, Senior Vice President for Research for Mote Marine Laboratory, a USF partner in spill research and in other endeavors, said scientists must take a long-view of the Gulf to see how species adapt to the impact. if the Gulf follows the same course as Prince William Sound did in Alaska after the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, it could be a decade or more before the true impact on marine life is known, he said.

“Just because the well is capped doesn’t mean this is over by a long shot,” Crosby said. “The real damage, the real impact to the ecosystem and the economy of this state has yet to come.”

USF President Judy Genshaft launched the ResearchOne events, noting that relevant, real-world science remains USF’s distinguishing attribute and connects the world of research science to everyday events and the public in a meaningful way.

“We were out there right away, and that makes all the difference,” Genshaft said.

Below is a video documentary on the College of Marine Science’s response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill:

Oil Spill Discussion Takes Center Stage

Sierra Club: Email – Oil Spill Commission Releases Full Report on BP Disaster

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1295014513 34 Sierra Club: Email Oil Spill Commission Releases Full Report on BP Disaster

Contacts: Maggie Kao (202) 675-2384 or Kristina Johnson (415) 977-5619

January 11, 2011Contacts: Maggie Kao (202) 675-2384 or Kristina Johnson (415) 977-5619

Oil Spill Commission Releases full Report on BP Disaster

Safety Problems Part of Industry Culture; More Oversight Needed

Washington, D.C. – Today, the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling released its full report on the BP disaster in the Gulf calling for widespread reform of the offshore drilling industry, including better safety regulations and more stringent enforcement by federal agencies.

Statement of Sierra Club Executive Director Michael Brune

“We commend the oil spill commission for its thorough and thoughtful examination of the worst environmental disaster in our nation’s history. This report is very timely, following a severe Alaskan pipeline leak this past week that reinforced the need for us to take a hard look at safety standards and our nation’s addiction to oil.

Following today’s report, our friends in the Gulf Coast will find little solace knowing that this tragedy could have been prevented. The commission found that the problems leading to the disaster are not unique to BP, but are pervasive within the oil industry. unfortunately, preventable explosions like the one that sparked the BP disaster happen all too frequently. According to the report, fatalities on U.S. offshore rigs are much higher than others in the world, yet reported accidents and injuries are lower than most. This signals a systemic problem among these companies.

Sadly, industry-wide disregard for the health and safety of their workers and coastal communities persists.

The commission has laid out important steps that will inform recovery and restoration efforts along the Gulf Coast, improve oversight of the offshore drilling industry, ensure that oil companies like BP are held accountable to pay the full cost of restoration, redirect funds to rebuild the Gulf Coast ecosystem, provide more funding for enforcement of critical regulations and clean up in the communities when future disasters occur.

We need to make sure that the federal government follows through on the commission’s recommendations to protect workers and coastal communities from future oil disasters, and that agencies, like the Interior Department have the resources they need to enforce new safety rules.

If we hope to reduce the number of oil spills, we will need to fully fund oversight and enforcement of offshore drilling, and the oil companies that profit from use of our shared public waters and lands should be at least partly responsible for funding these efforts. The Sierra Club is committed to making sure these recommendations are implemented.

But the only real way to make sure we don’t see another drilling disaster is to start reducing our dependence on oil now. We already have efficiency technology and clean energy solutions that will help move our nation beyond oil and make offshore drilling unnecessary.”

The Sierra Club is pleased that the commission’s report also includes several recommendations that have been priority elements of the Club’s disaster response agenda, specifically:

  • Ensuring that 80 percent of the anticipated clean Water Act penalties BP will pay are directed toward ecological restoration in the affected Gulf states;
  • Creating a Public Advisory Council to oversee how funds directed to the Gulf are used and to ensure sound science directs restoration projects;
  • Establishing a Regional Citizen’s Advisory Council, which would improve accountability and restore the public’s trust in recovery efforts and ideally be modeled after the Council created following the Exxon Valdez disaster;
  • Requiring higher-caliber emergency response plans for offshore drilling operations to protect the environment and worker safety; and
  • Making sure sound science informs decision-making about future offshore leasing efforts by suggesting a chief scientist position be created within the Interior Department to oversee leasing decisions.

Sierra Club: Email – Oil Spill Commission Releases Full Report on BP Disaster

Halliburton’s Legal Fate in Gulf Spill Still Uncertain

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1295003725 81 Halliburtons Legal Fate in Gulf Spill Still Uncertain

The Justice Department named nine defendants, including BP PLC and Transocean Ltd., when it filed its lawsuit in the Eastern District of Louisiana, but Halliburton, which played a major role in the Deepwater Horizon drilling operation, was conspicuous by its absence (Greenwire, Dec. 15, 2010).

The government is expected to announce criminal charges relating to the spill at some point, but so far, the focus has been on civil enforcement under such statutes as the clean Water Act and the Oil Pollution Act. all the parties involved are also named as defendants in hundreds of private lawsuits filed by individuals and businesses affected by the spill.

The report from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling found that Halliburton, along with BP and Transocean, were all guilty of “errors and misjudgments” in relation to the April 20 explosion and resulting spill (Greenwire, Jan 11).

A key example of Halliburton’s role was highlighted in the report’s fourth chapter, which focuses on the use of cement when drilling the well, which BP subcontracted out to the firm.

One of the report’s findings is that Halliburton had conducted tests in February 2010, two months before the disaster, that indicated the foam cement slurry used on the well was unstable.

The tests “should have prompted the company to reconsider its slurry design,” the report says.

In highlighting “root causes” of the subsequent explosion and spill, the commission refers to “insufficient controls in place” at Halliburton that would have ensured that “test results were vetted rigorously.”

“On the cement, they did the test, but they didn’t communicate the result of that test,” commission member Frances Beinecke, president of the Natural Resources Defense Council, said in an interview. “There were some real communication gaps, a lot of management errors, a lot of lack of information offshore and onshore, and among contractors.”

Wyn Hornbuckle, a Justice Department spokesman, declined to comment on the government’s plans in relation to Halliburton, noting that the release of the commission’s report would not directly affect the government’s investigation.

“The Justice Department’s investigation is ongoing, and we continue to examine all relevant facts and evidence as to what caused the spill and all parties that may be responsible,” he said.

At issue: liability under Oil Pollution Act

Lawyers familiar with the various lawsuits filed over the oil spill say Halliburton may have initially been omitted from the government complaint because of uncertainty over whether it could be held liable under the Oil Pollution Act, which imposes stiff penalties for spills but only on parties defined as “owners or operators.” as a subcontractor, Halliburton could argue that its conduct is not covered by the law.

Brendan Cummings, senior counsel at the Center for Biological Diversity, which has filed its own lawsuit over the spill, conceded that government lawyers may be concerned on that point, but he thinks it is still possible that Halliburton could be deemed an “owner or operator” under the Oil Pollution Act.

“One could argue that their involvement in the cementing rises to that level, so it is not out of the question that the government would add them as a defendant under the existing claims,” Cummings added.

The Oil Pollution Act also imposes “joint and several liability” on those who are responsible for a spill, meaning no single entity foots the bill, which could work against Halliburton, noted Rena Steinzor, an environmental law professor at the University of Maryland School of Law.

Aside from the Oil Pollution Act and clean Water Act, the government could look to other statutes with damages provisions, including the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Endangered Species Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act, legal experts noted.

Under all three, the damages would be significantly less than what is available under the Oil Pollution Act.

Cummings suggested that Halliburton could also face common law claims “if the government chooses to enter that realm.”

Ultimately, Halliburton’s toughest fight could be with BP, several lawyers speculated.

The report’s clear statement that blame should be distributed among the three companies potentially bolsters BP’s legal position because, for example, it could make the argument that it was Halliburton’s gross negligence, not its own, that led to the explosion, Steinzor said.

That could lead to BP suing Halliburton and could also implicate the indemnification agreement between the two firms signed when Halliburton agreed to work on the well.

Patti Goldman, vice president for litigation at Earthjustice, speculated that all the companies involved in the litigation could end up at each other’s throats.

“I would expect more infighting among the various entities who are potentially liable,” Goldman said.

Halliburton declined to comment on what civil claims the government might file.

Reporter Katie Howell contributed.

Copyright 2011 E&E Publishing. all Rights Reserved.

Halliburton’s Legal Fate in Gulf Spill Still Uncertain

BP sells Gulf of Mexico oil and gas fields to pay for oil spill

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BP sells Gulf of Mexico oil and gas fields to pay for oil spill this file photo made Aug. 3, 2010, shows the Development Driller III, which is drilling the primary relief well, and the Helix Q4000, background left, the vessel used to perform the static kill operation, at the site of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in Gulf of Mexico, off the coast of Louisiana. The Obama administration on Tuesday lifted the deep water oil drilling moratorium that the government imposed in the Gulf of Mexico in the wake of the disastrous BP oil spill. (AP)

LONDON — BP Chief Executive Bob Dudley accused some politicians and the media on Monday of being too hasty to pin all the blame on his company for the devastating Gulf of Mexico spill — and emphasized the need for deep-water drilling.

In his first major public speech since taking the top job, Dudley also said BP would not pull out of the United States — and that the U.S. needs a company with BP’s resources to meet its vast energy needs.

Dudley delivered a speech whose mood hovered between firm and penitent, seeking to make clear that BP was learning every lesson possible from the disaster. he stressed that he also has met with experts from other hazardous industries, including the nuclear and chemical industries, as part of the company’s focus on improving safety.

“We were certainly not perfect in our response, but we have tried to do the right thing,” Dudley added. before becoming the first American to lead the British oil company on Oct. 1, Dudley was in charge of BP’s spill response efforts in the Gulf.

U.S. lawmakers have widely blamed BP for the disaster.

On Monday, Dudley said many parties, including the media and rival oil companies, were guilty of “a great rush to judgment” before all the facts were known.

“I watched graphic projections of oil swirling around the Gulf, around Florida, across and around Bermuda to England — these appeared authoritative and inevitable. The public fear was everywhere,” he said.

The company’s own investigation shared the blame between BP, rig owner Transocean Ltd. and contractor Halliburton co.

But former EPA Administrator William K. Reilly, co-chair of an independent oil spill commission investigating the rig explosion, suggested Monday that BP fed the fear and mistrust by initially minimizing the impact of the spill.

In an interview with The associated Press in new Orleans, Reilly said the company shouldn’t downplay the significance of “what occurred and what happened on their watch and what was their responsibility to prevent.”

The U.S. government could fine BP up to $21 billion for the spill, on top of a $20 billion disaster fund that the company has committed itself to. A bill that passed in the U.S. House of Representatives would prevent companies like BP that have a poor safety record from getting new offshore permits. A Senate bill that was eventually tabled didn’t contain a similar provision.

Speaking at an annual conference of Britain’s leading business lobby group, Dudley stressed BP’s commitment to the United States despite the ongoing political and public fallout and talked up the company’s ability to withstand the expected financial hit from the spill.

Earlier Monday, BP announced it has sold its stake in four mature oil and gas fields in the Gulf of Mexico to Marubeni Oil and Gas for $650 million (euro466 million). The fields were part of a recent acquisition of Gulf assets from Devon Energy and were considered nonessential. BP is hoping to raise $30 billion from selling assets and already has raked in almost $9 billion from the sale of properties in Egypt, Canada, the U.S. and Colombia.

Dudley argued that deepwater drilling is necessary despite the dangers. he cited predictions that the world could be consuming 40 percent more energy than today by 2030. Deepwater drilling is projected to grow to account for 9 percent of total oil supplies in 2020, from 7 percent currently.

He said BP is “one of only a handful of companies with the financial and technological strengths to undertake development projects in these difficult geographies and it can be done safely.”

BP continues to make plans for further drilling projects in the Gulf of Mexico. Rig owner Pride International Inc. said BP has leased two of its deepwater rigs. one of those rigs is already in the Gulf and another is on its way. Pride spokeswoman Kate Perez said it’s unclear what projects are in store for those rigs — they still could be moved out of the Gulf.

BP relies on the Gulf for about 10 percent of its total oil and gas production.

President Barack Obama recently lifted a moratorium on new deepwater drilling in the Gulf, imposed after the April 20 explosion that kicked off the worst oil spill in U.S. history. Obama is due to announce further recommendations under a presidential commission in the coming months.

Dudley, who took over from gaffe-prone former CEO Tony Hayward early this month, also sought again to reassure business leaders that the company has the financial strength to shoulder the anticipated heavy costs of the Gulf spill.

Dudley said he has spent much of his time since becoming CEO traveling the world to visit BP’s partners.

“Our underlying operational and financial performance is sound,” he said, stressing the company’s wide geographical reach.

Analysts responded with optimism.

“That’s what the company needs, it needs a determined champion not an apologist,” said Nick McGregor, an analyst at Redmayne-Bentley Stockbrokers. “He’s going to want to go forward and leave the apologies … his job is to acknowledge the past, not continuously apologize for it.”

Dudley dismissed suggestions that the United States might turn its back on the company, or that BP could voluntarily leave the United States.

“I am confident that neither of these propositions is true,” he said. “Contrary to what is sometimes said, BP is not widely seen over there as ‘British Petroleum’: we’re part of the American community.”

Associated Press writers Chris Kahn in new York and Brian Skoloff in new Orleans contributed to this report.

BP sells Gulf of Mexico oil and gas fields to pay for oil spill

Flawed Cement Fingered As Possible Oil Spill Culprit

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1288372524 92 Flawed Cement Fingered As Possible Oil Spill Culprit

Posted on: Friday, 29 October 2010, 06:35 CDT

Officials participating in the federal government’s investigation into the cause or causes of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and the ensuing oil spill appear to have found at least one potential culprit: faulty cement.

In a letter sent to members of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, including Co-chairmen Bob Graham and William K. Reilly, Oil Spill Commission (OSC) chief counsel Fred Bartlit wrote that only one out of four preliminary tests conducted by Halliburton, the company which provided the cement used to seal the drilling rig, showed that their proposed concrete mixture would be able to hold.

Furthermore, Bartlit claims that laboratory tests using materials provided by Halliburton were "unable to generate stable foam cement." Those tests were conducted at a Houston-based facility by cement industry experts at Chevron, Bartlit notes in his letter. Representatives from the laboratories are scheduled to speak to members of the Oil Spill Commission in November.

In response to the letter, Halliburton officials released a statement Thursday evening, in which they noted that the mixtures which failed initial testing were not "very similar" as was suggested in Bartlit’s letter.

The company claimed that two of the tests, which were conducted in February, were "preliminary, pilot tests" and did not feature the same mixture used in later testing because "final well conditions were not known at that time."

Also at issue is how much BP knew about the quality of the cement, and what role they played in the testing process. Bartlit wrote in his letter that the British petroleum company "may or may not" have had results from the third test, a failed one which took place in April, prior to the evening of April 19, one day before the explosion that would kill 11 workers on board the Deepwater Horizon.

In their statement, Halliburton notes that BP "was made aware of the issues with that test" and that the test was "irrelevant because the laboratory did not use the correct amount of cement blend."

Furthermore, in the company’s statement, Halliburton officials claim that following the one successful test, BP "subsequently instructed" them to make last-minute changes to the mixture, increasing the amount of retarder used from eight gallons per 100 sacks to cement to nine.

"Tests, including thickening time and compressive strength, were performed on the nine gallon formulation (the cement formulation actually pumped) and were shared with BP before the cementing job had begun.  A foam stability test was not conducted on the nine gallon formulation," they added.

According to the associated Press (AP), "The independent investigators do not address other decisions that could have contributed to the cement’s failure and the eventual blowout, such as BP’s decision to use fewer centralizers than recommended by Halliburton. Centralizers make sure the well’s piping is centered inside the well so the cement bonds correctly."

"BP has also been criticized for not performing a cement bond long, a test that checks after the cement is pumped down whether it is secure," the AP also wrote on Thursday. "There are also questions about whether BP pumped down enough cement to seal off the bottom of the well, which was located more than three miles below sea level."

The April 20 explosion onboard the Deepwater Horizon resulted in what many are calling the worst environmental disaster in American history. For some five months after the leak began, just two days after the blast that caused the oil rig to sink, a total of 200 million gallons of petroleum leaked into the Gulf of Mexico, harming wildlife and crippling the region’s fishing industry.

On Wednesday, as part of the ongoing investigation, a federal court in new Orleans ordered that a security perimeter be established around the site where the spill originated. The zone, which extends for 750 feet in all directions from where the Deepwater Horizon sank, was set up in order to prevent "tampering with the site and the surrounding area" and "is intended to serve as the equivalent of yellow crime-scene tape," according to Neela Banerjee of the Los Angeles Times.

  • National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling
  • BP
  • Halliburton
  • Chevron

Source: RedOrbit Staff & Wire Reports

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Flawed Cement Fingered As Possible Oil Spill Culprit

Florida Outlines BP Gulf Oil Spill Response For July 11, 2010

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1287918926 60 Florida Outlines BP Gulf Oil Spill Response For July 11, 2010

On Day 83 of the Gulf oil spill crude oil tar balls, tar patties and light sheen continue to be reported in Northwest Florida.

Continued impacts are likely in Northwest Florida over the next 72 hours. View the Florida Gator Interactive Oil Spill Map.

BP reports installing the sealing cap is proceeding as planned: all 6 bolts were removed over night from the flange; using the Discoverer Inspiration, the flange overshot tool removed the flange and is now lifting it back to surface; ROVs are removing 4 pipe sleeves from around the flex joint flange.

All gulf beaches in Escambia County remain under an Oil Impact Notice that will stay in effect until beaches are no longer impacted by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The notice is not in effect for inland beaches along Pensacola and Escambia bays or for bayous.

As of 10:00 a.m., July 11, 2010, there are three Oil Impact Notices reported due to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, affecting 15 beaches:

Escambia: County Park East, County Park West, Johnson Beach, Pensacola (Casino) Beach and Perdido Key State Park.

Okaloosa: Brackin Wayside, Henderson State Park Beach, and James Lee Park Beach.

Walton: Blue Montain Beach Access, County Park, Dune Allen Beach Access, Eastern Lake Beach Access, Grayton Beach Access, Holly Street Beach Access and Inlet Beach Access (TDC Beach Access).

On July 10, BP recovered a total of approximately 15,200 barrels: 7,096 barrels of oil were collected, 8,100 barrels of oil were flared and 35.2 million cubic feet of natural gas were flared.

Total oil recovered from both the LMRP Cap and Q4000 systems since they were implemented is 749,100 barrels. An additional 22,000 barrels were collected from the RIT tool earlier in May bringing the total recovered to 771,100 barrels.

Approximately 551 miles of Gulf Coast shoreline is currently oiled: 92 miles in Florida, 297 miles in Louisiana, 97 miles in Mississippi, and 65 miles in Alabama.

About 1.76 million gallons of total dispersant have been applied: 1.07 million on the surface and 692,000 subsea. More than 29.1 million gallons of an oil-water mix have been recovered.

Under the leadership of Governor Charlie Crist, the State Emergency Response Team and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) are actively coordinating and responding to the Deepwater Horizon incident.

The following is a summary of state and BP response actions to date, as well as tips for residents and visitors to take precautions both pre and post-landfall.

Map of BP Oil Spill as of July 11, 2010. Click on images for larger picture.This forecast is based on the NWS spot forecast from Saturday, July 10 PM. Currents were obtained from several models (NOAA Gulf of Mexico, West Florida Shelf/USF, TGLO/TAMU, NAVO/NRL) and HFR measurements. The model was initialized from Saturday satellite imagery analysis (NOAA/NESDIS) and Saturday overflights. The leading edge may contain tarballs that are not readily observable from the imagery (hence not included in the model initialization). Oil near bay inlets could be brought into that bay by local tidal currents.

Winds are expected to be mostly southwesterly to westerly at 10 kts or less throughout this forecast period. Remote sensing imagery and overflights have indicated scattered areas of potential oil remaining in northern Chandeleur and Mississippi Sound, which will continue to threaten the coastlines of MS and AL. For the Alabama-Florida Panhandle coast, models show eastward coastal currents occurring over the next few days, leading to an eastward extension of forecast uncertainty bounds into Florida. to the west, models indicate that patches of oil observed off Marsh Island, Caillou Bay, and Terrebonne Bay will begin to move eastward, with scattered shoreline impacts between Atchafalaya Bay and Southwest Pass. Further west, a patch of floating oil observed between Galveston and Sabine Pass is projected to move eastward, threatening the shoreline around the Texas-Louisiana border.

Landfall Reports and Predictions:

Nearly 90 percent of Florida’s more than 1,260 miles of coastline remains unimpacted.

If oil is sighted on Florida’s coastline report it to the State Warning Point at 1-877-2-SAVE-FL (1-877-272-8335) or by dialing #DEP from most cell phones.

Pensacola Pass as well as Perdido Pass will continue to be closed with the tide to reduce the amount of oil entering inland waters. These waterways are manned to allow access to necessary vessel traffic and are open for vessel traffic during low tide. See NOAA tide predictions.

Observations by NOAA continue to indicate no significant amounts of oil moving toward the Loop Current. The Loop Current Ring, a circular current which was formerly part of the Loop Current provides no clear path for oil to enter the Florida Straits.

There have been no reports of Deepwater Horizon oil spill-related products reaching the shore beyond the Northwest Florida region. there is no indication that the rest of the state will have impacts from weathered oil products within the next 72 hours.

No significant tropical activity is expected in the next 48 hours.

On Site Actions:

Current projections estimate Deepwater Horizon’s discharge at 35,000 to 60,000 barrels per day. Learn more.

On July 10, BP began replacing the existing lower marine riser package (LMRP) containment system with a new “capping stack” procedure—designed to capture greater quantities of oil. BP also is in the process of connecting a third vessel, the Helix Producer, which will increase collection capacity to an estimated 53,000 barrels per day by bringing up additional oil up through the kill line.

BP continues efforts to drill two relief wells.

State Actions:

The State Emergency Operations Center is activated at Level 1.

Five state-leased skimmers continue to operate in Northwest Florida to protect sensitive inland water bodies. These skimmers are operating at the passes in Escambia, Okaloosa, Bay, Gulf and Franklin Counties.

Two Florida branch offices committed to oil spill response are open in Northwest Florida. The Pensacola branch office, which serves both Escambia and Santa Rosa counties, and the Destin branch office, which serves both Okaloosa and Walton counties, bring together federal, state and local agencies to streamline response efforts. Learn more.

DEP continues to conduct water sampling monitoring to establish baseline conditions throughout the state. Learn more about sampling and results at dep.state.fl.us/deepwaterhorizon/water.htm.DEP’s Office of Coastal and Aquatic Managed Areas is conducting water sampling under the Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) process. Learn more.

Real-time sampling data from statewide air quality monitoring can be viewed at dep.state.fl.us/deepwaterhorizon/air.htm.

Air quality reports for July 10 revealed that air quality was considered moderate for ozone and fine particulate concentrations in Northwest Florida. “Moderate” means air quality is acceptable for most people.

Boom Placement:

Approximately 454,200 feet of hard boom and 8,260 feet of sorbent boom have been placed in Northwest Florida along the most sensitive areas. Additionally, counties in the region are moving forward with supplemental booming plans. As of July 10, 316,261 feet of supplemental boom has been deployed or staged by Florida contractors.

Health Effects:

Oil Impact Notices are posted for all Escambia County and Walton County Gulf beaches, as well as designated beaches in Okaloosa County. Signs may remain in place until local authorities determine that beaches are no longer impacted by the oil spill. Learn more.

If residents or visitors see tar or oiled debris on the beach, DO NOT PICK IT UP. For most people, an occasional brief contact with a small amount of oil will not cause any harm, however it is not recommended. Learn more.

The July 4 Gulf of Mexico federal fisheries closure remains in effect. The closure measures 81,181 square miles. this federal closure does not apply to any state

Fisheries & Seafood:

The July 4 Gulf of Mexico federal fisheries closure remains in effect. The closure measures 81,181 square miles. this federal closure does not apply to any state waters and still leaves approximately 66 percent of Gulf federal waters available for fishing. Learn more.

A portion of coastal state waters offshore of Escambia County is closed to the harvest of saltwater fish, crabs and shrimp. Learn more.

To report oiled wildlife, please call 1-866-557-1401. For the safety of the public as well as the safety of animals, rescues should only be conducted by trained responders. Learn more.

Visit bpdecon.com for a list of vessel decontamination locations for oiled boats within the U.S. Coast Guard Mobile Sector.

Tips for Homeowners:

While the state appreciates the concern expressed by Floridians and the ingenuity of those seeking alternative measures to help protect the state’s shoreline, the following tips are offered to ensure that these measures are helpful and not harmful to Florida’s coasts, wildlife and water resources: Tips for homeowners.

Tips for Businesses and Consumers:

The Attorney General’s fraud hotline is open to receive any reports of fraud or price gouging. The hotline is 1-866-966-7226.

The Florida Agriculture and Consumer Services Commissioner gas price-gouging hotline is also operational. The toll-free hotline number is 1-800-HELP-FLA (1-800-435-7352).

Coastal businesses should make loss of earnings claims for damages incurred as a result of the oil spill. Learn more at myfloridacfo.com/ or by calling 1-850-413-3089 or toll-free at 1-877-MY-FL-CFO (1-877-693-5236).

To discuss spill related damage with BP representatives, please call the BP Claims Reporting Line at 1-800-440-0858.

Volunteer Opportunities:

Individuals interested in volunteering can register at volunteerfloridadisaster.org.

Volunteers will not be in direct contact with oil or oil-contaminated materials.

The Governor’s Commission on Volunteerism and Community Service – Volunteer Florida is encouraging Floridians and visitors to stay current on the latest information on scheduled beach cleanups and other local volunteer opportunities.

Learn More about Florida’s Response:

Visit deepwaterhorizonflorida.com to learn more about Florida’s response to the Deepwater Horizon incident, sign up for daily updates, view tips for businesses and consumers, and much more.

For a list of Unified Command, BP and Florida phone numbers, visit dep.state.fl.us/deepwaterhorizon/default.htm#numbers.

The Oil Spill Information Line is available at 1-888-337-3569 from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. seven days a week. Additional phone numbers have also been established for persons with disabilities: (800) 955-8771 (TDD) or (800) 955-8770 (voice).

Topics: 2010, beaches, BP, British Petroleum, business, coastline, Deepwater Horizon, Economy, emergency response, environment, environmental impact, Fishery Failure Determination, fishing, Florida, Florida seafood products, GOHSEP, Governance, government, Governor Charlie Crist, Gulf of Mexico, gulf oil map, July 11, landfall predictions, loans, Mexico Beach, moniter, monitor, news, noaa oil spill, Obama Administration, oil loop current, Oil Rig, oil spill, oil spill forecast, oil spill map, Panama City Beach, Panhandle, Pensacola Beach, Pensacola Pass, pollution, President Obama, tourism, Transocean, U.S., United States, VISIT FLORIDA marketing campaign, White House, visitflorida.com

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Florida Outlines BP Gulf Oil Spill Response For July 11, 2010

BP points fingers in oil spill blame game (Reuters)

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1284005720 26 BP points fingers in oil spill blame game (Reuters)

LONDON/WASHINGTON (Reuters) – BP Plc and its Gulf of Mexico oil well partners traded blame on Wednesday after an internal BP investigation tried to downplay the company’s role in the world’s biggest offshore spill.

The 193-page BP report offered a preview of how the British oil giant plans to vigorously defend itself against lawsuits arising from the disaster and any charges of gross negligence, which carry fines potentially in excess of $20 billion.

BP accepted some responsibility for the disaster but pointed the finger at what it said were major failures by Transocean ltd, the operator of the ill-fated Deepwater Horizon oil rig, and oil services company Halliburton, which cemented the deep-sea well that ruptured on April 20.

The report drew fire from a prominent U.S. lawmaker who accused BP of trying to minimize its role in the disaster. Transocean called it a “self-serving” attempt by BP to escape responsibility for its “fatally flawed” well design, while Halliburton said the report was filled with inaccuracies.

The report threatened to reignite public anger over the massive spill, which caused an environmental catastrophe along the U.S. Gulf Coast, devastated tourism and fishing in the area and damaged President Barack Obama’s popularity.

Obama’s spokesman, Robert Gibbs, declined to comment on BP’s findings and said the government was still investigating the disaster to “find out what went wrong and hold those responsible accountable for the damage that’s been done.”

COMPLEX SERIES OF FAILURES

BP investigators were unable to identify any single action or inaction that caused the Deepwater Horizon rig to blow up on April 20, killing 11 workers, after the Macondo well ruptured.

“Rather, a complex and interlinked series of mechanical failures, human judgments, engineering design, operational implementation and team interfaces came together to allow the initiation and escalation of the accident,” the report said.

“Multiple companies, work teams and circumstances were involved over time.”

Investors had been eagerly awaiting the report to find out whether BP would be able to share the potential costs of the spill — estimated by some analysts to exceed $50 billion.

Citigroup analysts said in a research note that BP’s report “appears to support the case for no negligence,” but they acknowledged that the findings of the internal investigation were unlikely to be accepted as objective.

BP shares trading in new York closed up 3.2 percent, while shares of Transocean were 1.3 percent higher and those of Halliburton were up 1.2 percent.

Standard & Poor’s downgraded Transocean’s rating to BBB from BBB-plus, saying the Swiss-based company faced uncertain liabilities arising from the disaster.

The U.S. Justice Department could pursue a variety of civil and criminal charges against the companies involved in the spill. Any penalties could be in the billions of dollars.

The ruptured well unleashed a torrent of crude that spewed until it was capped three months later on July 15, after 4.9 million barrels of oil had leaked into the sea.

The top U.S. official overseeing the spill response, retired Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen, said on Wednesday that BP may not start the final “kill” of its well until mid- to late September.

The BP report, overseen by BP’s head of safety, Mark Bly, highlighted eight key failures that led to the blowout of the well and the subsequent explosion aboard the rig.

It defended BP’s much-criticized single-casing well design; the use of fewer-than-recommended centralizers (devices used to ensure the cement casing is applied evenly around the well); and the decision to replace heavy drilling mud, which was keeping the well under control, with lighter water.

“It would appear unlikely that the well design contributed to the incident,” said BP’s outgoing Chief Executive Tony Hayward, who has faced withering criticism from U.S. lawmakers for initially playing down the scale of the disaster.

“HAPPY TO SLICE UP BLAME”

BP, which has seen almost $70 billion wiped off its market value since April 20, is trying to rehabilitate its tarnished public image and restore investor confidence, spending millions of dollars on positive television and newspaper advertising.

“This report is not BP’s mea culpa,” said Democratic congressman Edward Markey, an outspoken critic of BP’s handling of the disaster. “Of their own eight key findings, they only explicitly take responsibility for half of one. BP is happy to slice up blame, as long as they get the smallest piece.”

Energy industry analysts were also not convinced by the BP findings, noting its investigators did not have access to everyone who had been involved in the project.

“Make no mistake, our view remains that this is BP’s well, and BP is in charge of design and execution,” Houston energy investment boutique Tudor Pickering Holt & Co said in a note.

The BP investigation found fault with Transocean employees aboard the rig at the time of the accident.

“Over a 40-minute period, the Transocean rig crew failed to recognize and act on the influx of hydrocarbons into the well,” BP said.

But Transocean said BP was seeking to conceal the key factor that led to the rig explosion — the well design.

“In both its design and construction, BP made a series of cost-saving decisions that increased risk,” it said.

Halliburton joined Transocean in rejecting the findings, saying the BP report contained “substantial omissions and inaccuracies” and stressed it was fully indemnified for any allegations in the document.

In pointing the finger at its contractors, BP said:

– Halliburton had used an “unstable” cement mixture that allowed hydrocarbons to leak into the well.

– there was “no indication” that Transocean had tested the automatic shut-off function on the blowout preventer before it was used on the Deepwater Horizon rig. (Blowout preventers are designed to halt all oil and gas flow and contain pressure if there is an uncontrollable gush from a seabed well.)

– The rig crew diverted the flow of drilling mud and hydrocarbons into the wrong system after the blowout. this meant gas vented onto the rig floor, rather than toward the sea, where it would have been less likely to cause a blast.

Transocean spokesman Lou Colasuonno said the blowout preventer was “inspected, tested and went through a rigorous maintenance schedule prior to being placed on the Macondo well and was then tested weekly, right up until 72 hours prior to the blast.”

“Any statement to the contrary is false,” he said.

The damaged blowout preventer is key evidence in criminal and civil investigations of the blast. BP retrieved it from the seabed on Saturday under watch of federal investigators and it is being sent to a NASA facility in Louisiana.

(Additional reporting by Matt Daily in new York, Kristen Hays in Houston and Matt Spetalnick in Washington; Writing by Ross Colvin; Editing by John O’Callaghan and Tim Dobbyn)

BP points fingers in oil spill blame game (Reuters)